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The fiftieth anniversary of the passing of Nishida Kitard offers an occasion not only to look back on his philosophy but also to consider its relevance to contemporary issues. For many people 
today, however, postwar criticism has cast a long shadow of doubt 
on Nishida’s reputation and relevance for the contemporary world. 
Ever since the Pacific War, critics have sought connections between 
Nishida’s later writings and Japanese imperialism. In the last five years 
or so, the controversy over Nishida’s work and intentions has heated 
up, in the wake of revelations about the activity of other philosophers 
and scholars such as Martin Heidegger, Paul DeMan, and Mircea 
Eliade. It has become clear that some of their political practices in the 
1930s and 40s advanced the cause of fascism in Europe. Critics have 
also sought to uncover the political implications, sometimes per­
nicious, of even the apparently nonpolitical thought of these various 
influential thinkers, including Nishida. We may call this aspect of criti­
cism the politicization of their thought. The evaluations of the critics 
clearly deserve close attention. Some recent scholarship both within 
Japan and abroad, however, suggests that Nishida’s thought should be 
depoliticized, not repoliticized as in the case of the European thinkers. 
That is, some Nishida scholars now read his political treatises as a 
philosophy of culture instead of a justification of state-nationalism (S3 
and Japanese expansionism.1 In the following I will show that,
1 See the essays by Ueda Shizuteru and Andrew Feenberg in Rude A  wakenings: Zen, 
The K yoto  School, and The Question o f  Nationalism, ed. J. Heisig & J. Maraldo
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although Nishida’s conception of culture is too closely identified with 
nation states, his philosophy offers a conceptualization with which we 
can reexamine current problems of multiculturalism, multinational re­
lations, the Eurocentrism of philosophy, and the construction of Asia 
as an Other.
The project of reexamining these issues in the light of Nishida’s 
philosophy of culture will require that we first understand the reasons 
that this philosophy became politicized. That is, in order to appropri­
ate Nishida’s philosophy of culture, and apply it to understanding our 
world as well as his, it is necessary to retrieve the contexts in which his 
later philosophy has been read, particularly the political contexts. In 
fact, when we read Nishida among a vast array of other philosophers 
who lived before and after him as well as during his lifetime, we al­
ready place him, often unconsciously, in contexts different from the 
one in which he wrote. We need, then, to recontextualize his philos­
ophy before we can appropriate it. An appropriation of Nishida’s 
philosophy of culture will take it in a direction that he himself did not 
anticipate. Most of what I will say in the following will merely clear 
some ground for taking Nishida in this direction. What I offer here is 
no more than a beginning in such an appropriation. Moreover, the 
beginning will produce largely negative conclusions, lessons we might 
learn about what is involved in reading a philosopher that we and he 
himself took to be a spokesperson for something called “ the East.” 
Much more exploration of the recontextualized content of his philos­
ophy of culture will have to be done to finish the task, but I hope at 
least to show that some recontextualizing on our part is called for.
Discourse about culture is probably more globally politicized today 
than during 1930s and 40s when Nishida was writing. So the first step in 
translating his philosophy of culture into a contemporary idiom is to 
contrast the political contexts in which it has been read.
The Politicization o f  Nishida’s Philosophy
Nishida did not think of his work as a political philosophy, even when 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995) and the book by Agustin Jacinto Zavala, 
La Filosofia Social de Nishida KitarO 1935-1945 (El Colegio de MichoacAn, Mexico, 
1994).
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he begin to write short pieces for political leaders and government offi­
cials, and then apparently very reluctantly. But whether or not he did 
like it or would, Nishida’s philosophy became politicized, and for three 
reasons, I think. The first has to do with the internal development of 
his thought, the second with external government pressure in the 1940s, 
and the third with much more recent events. I want to review these rea­
sons before turning to his philosophy of culture proper.
Up to 1930 Nishida developed a philosophy of consciousness that 
had little to do with the social and historical world. But he did 
philosophize in continual interaction with his colleagues and students 
and with the German and English texts he read. In 1930 Tanabe 
Hajime, Nishida’s younger colleague and by then his successor at the 
Imperial University of Kyoto, criticized Nishida for determining the 
world in terms of a transhistorical principle, self-awareness that 
did not do justice to the irrationality of history and the actual develop­
ment of the world.2 Tanabe went on to develop his own “ logic of spe­
cies” or sociocultural specificity that placed social entities between the 
individual and the genus or universal.3
2 See Nishida Sensei no oshie o aogu in Tanabe Hajime &
Tsujimura Kdichi, eds. H ja x , B  (Gendai shiso taikei S 23)
(Tokyo: Chikuma shobO, 1965), especially pp. 347-8.
3 The 1934 article “ Shakai sonzai no ronri”  introduces Tanabe’s new
logic; and volumes 6 and 7 o f the Collected Works of Tanabe Hajime 
(Tokyo, Chikuma shobO, 1964), contain six other early essays on the logic of species.
Tanabe emphasized, more than Nishida had, the social and histori­
cal conditioning of humans. The nation state had a special status; it* 
was a kind of universal that could mediate conflict between the individ­
ual and the species. At least when it was successful at such mediation, 
the state embodied rationality, morality, law, and social justice, and 
was the ultimate subject of history. In the development of his “ logic of 
historical reality” and “ logic of national existence,” Tanabe hesitated 
simply to identify the nation state with the Absolute. Instead, by ap­
plying a Mahayana Buddhist logic, he proposed that the Japanese 
nation state was a particular manifestation of the formless Absolute, 
in theory not superior to any other nation state. In fact, however, in 
the early forties Tanabe affirmed the uniqueness and universal charac­
ter of the Japanese nation state, which was unified by the Emperor.
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Before the end of the war, however, he experienced a change of heart 
and wrote a major work he called Philosophy as Metanoetics that 
denounced his previous nationalism and yet opted for a personal sur­
render to the Pure Land Buddhist ideal of Other Power Nishida in 
the meantime took to heart Tanabe’s criticism and began to develop a 
philosophy of history and culture.
Criticisms by Nishida’s former student who became a Marxist, Tosa- 
ka Jun, also spurned him to turn his efforts toward questions of the 
social and historical worlds. In 1932 Tosaka had called Nishida’s 
philosophy “ the most majestic bourgeois idealism in the country, or 
the world, for that matter,” a philosophy that reduces [social] praxis to 
personal ethical action, and ignores the material constituents of society 
like production and politics. Dialectics and history, Tosaka insisted, 
are founded only in history, not in transhistorical meanings or the con­
sciousness that supposedly constitutes them.4 Nishida wrote that he 
was grateful for all the things he learned from Tosaka’s critique, and 
that he wanted to take up the important points made by the Marxists,5 
although a year later he referred to the “ onesidedness” of Marxism: the 
residue of the natural sciences that takes nature to be opposed to self 
and has yet to clarify the “ objective world of the truly acting self.”6 1 
think that Nishida’s later ideas of the self-formation of the historical 
world, of poiesis, and of “ active intuition” arose directly
4 K yoto gakuha no tetsugaku in the Collected Works o f Tosaka Jun
III (Tokyo: KeisO shobd,1966), pp. 172-4. For a critique o f  Nishida’s 
philosophy o f  history, see my article, “The Absolute Present: Chasm or Chiasm o f  
History in Nishida Philosophy?” in Nishida Tetsugaku Ueda Shizuteru, ed.
-tffiRWW (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1994), pp. 1-17.
3 See letter #749 o f  October 4, 1932, to Tosaka in the Collected Works o f Nishida 
KitarO (hereafter nkz) 18 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978), p. 460.
6 K oi no sekai—Sosetsu f r [The world o f action: summary 1,”  in nkz 
7, pp. 178-9.
from his contemplation of Marxist ideas of production, even if he re­
jected Marxist materialism. In any case, Nishida’s own social interac­
tion with his major philosophical critics prompted him to develop a 
social philosophy and philosophy of culture that were later implicated 
in Japanese nationalism and state politics.
This brings us to the second reason that Nishida’s philosophy 
became politicized: external pressure from the state. I will not go into
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all the historical details surrounding the cooptation of Nishida’s 
philosophy by government officials. But I will mention two representa­
tive writings that made him the object of attack by rightists during the 
war and leftists afterwards. By 1938 Nishida was giving lectures on 
“ the problem of Japanese culture.”  I will return to the content of these 
lectures shortly; for now we should note that they in part were meant to 
offer an alternative to the narrow Japan-centrism that was at the center 
of government propaganda aimed at converting the people to belief in 
their nation’s mission and at making “ a million hearts beat as one,” as 
the wartime slogan went. What moved government and military offi­
cials to ask for Nishida’s assistance in their efforts was probably more 
his prestige as Japan’s premier philosopher than his philosophy of cul­
ture which was scarcely intelligible to them. Nishida also had personal 
ties to some of Japan’s leaders; Konoe Fumimaro who was twice prime 
minister (1937-39 and 1940-41) had been one of his early students, for 
example. According to his biographers, Nishida agreed to address this 
audience of officials very reluctantly. He used many of their terms, but 
attempted to twist a new meaning out of them—key terms like kokutai 
(B te), the entity of the nation that Japanists took as absolutely unique 
and without peer in the world, and terms like “ the new world order” 
that was suggested to Konoe as the goal of Japan’s mission.
I want to make a simple point about Nishida’s involvement in state 
politics: He thought he was saying or doing one thing; his audiences 
took his words for something else. He thought he was borrowing their 
language to convince them of alternative possibilities; they missed the 
gist of the alternatives or missed the point altogether. In his short ad­
dress called “ Principles for a New World Order,” written in May, 1943 
at the behest of the Institute for National Policy, he tried to convince 
the authorities that the age of the assertive, individualist nation-state 
was over, was a 19th century notion, and that this century required of 
Japan a global conception of itself as a world power interacting with 
other world powers as a group of mutually-defining equals. Whether 
the officials understood his intentions or not, we do not know, but ap­
parently Prime Minister TOjO did not like what he read, or so Nishida 
complained in a letter: the government had excerpted his words out of 
context, simplified and distorted his text.7 Then after the war it was
7 See his letter to Watsuji Tetsurd of June 23, 1943, in NKZ 19, p. 245, #1784.
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easy for critics to read the text as a justification for Japan’s asserting it­
self as an imperialist power like Western world powers. Just eight 
months later in 1943 Nishida tried again, perhaps too naively, and 
wrote a tract on the kokutai, calling this “ national polity” in his own 
language “ a self-determination of the Absolute Present that includes 
past and future within itself,” or again, calling the national polity the 
achievement of a people who determine themselves as the Absolute 
Present, with the Imperial Throne as its center.8 Once again the 
officials could make little sense of his Absolute Present but could em­
phasize the central role accorded to the imperial family.
8 NKZ 12, pp. 403, 409.
9 I am grateful to Yoko Arisaka for calling my attention to this interpretation of the 
kokutai ideology.
It was easy for postwar critics to latch onto this same point and tie 
Nishida’s emperor-ism to Japanese imperialism. I think these two 
“ isms” must be kept distinct, for the view that the Imperial Throne 
is central in Japanese history does not entail domination over other 
countries. Some scholars suggest that the ideology of kokutai did in 
effect entail that the Japanese Imperial Throne would have to dominate 
the world, because that was the way in which it expressed its goodness. 
In that case, emperor-ism and imperialism would indeed converge.9 
Yet another historical incident suggests otherwise: after the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima, on August 9, 1945, Emperor Hirohito met in 
secret with his Leadership Council, four ministers in military uniform, 
to decide how many conditions to demand for the surrender of Japan. 
All agreed on one condition immediately: the preservation of the 
kokutaiy by which they meant the imperial system. Surely this cannot 
have entailed for these imperialists about to surrender a claim to domi­
nation over the world, or even over East Asia. Nevertheless, I find both 
an analogy and an ambiguity in Nishida’s view of the roles of the 
throne in Japan and of Japan in East Asia. Japan’s central role in East 
Asia is analogous to the place of the Imperial Throne in Japan; but it 
is not clear whether that place in Nishida’s mind is an “ empty center,” 
a kind of clearing space for political conflict and contesting forms of 
government, or whether it is an active unifying force meant to represent 
and act for others.
In the context of his own writings, Nishida was far from being a
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nationalistic supporter of Japanese expansionism. But the view of 
postwar critique is different. Early postwar critics examined Nishida’s 
politicized writings in the context not of their intentions, but of their 
effects on a people and a nation monstrously misled into aggressions 
and self-deception. More recent critics have examined the writings for 
the context that intellectuals like Nishida helped construct, a construc­
tion that continues to mislead Japanese people and Western admirers 
about a “ Japanese spirit,” a unique “ Japanese culture,”  a Japan as 
exemplar of “ the East” as opposed to “ the West” —regardless of what 
criticisms and novel interpretations Nishida may have given these no­
tions in his day. And contemporary critics have become particularly 
sensitive to fascist undertones in intellectuals aligned, rightly or not, 
with nationalism during the 30s and 40s. The main reason for that sen­
sitivity, and for the recent repoliticization of Nishida’s entire philoso­
phy, is the revelation of Heidegger’s further involvement with Nazism 
that 1 mentioned at the beginning of this article.
Since I am interested in a contrast of the contexts in which Nishida is 
read, it is important to note some differences between Heidegger’s case 
and Nishida’s. First, Heidegger was involved as the rector and then 
professor ordinarius of Freiburg University, that is, as a state official 
and spokesperson for the German state. Nishida, on the other hand, 
was a private citizen called to advise or support government officials.10 
Nevertheless, we should remember that Nishida was a very prominent 
“ private” citizen whose writings, whether straight or distorted, did 
become very public documents. Besides this difference in public roles, 
three more differences are notable. Heidegger is implicated in a 
pernicious ideology more clearly by his acts and nonphilosophical writ­
ings, whereas Nishida is implicated more clearly by writings he consi­
dered part of his overall philosophy, than by acts commonly consi­
dered as political.11 Again we should add a reminder: it is now common 
practice to find a political undercurrent in all of Heidegger’s writings, 
and to consider all acts as political. Yet the relative contrast, between
10 For further reflections on this difference see Andrew Feenberg, “The Problem of 
Modernity in the Philosophy of Nishida,”  in Rude Awakenings: Zen, The Kyoto 
School, and The Question o f  Nationalism, p. 169.
11 Jan Van Bragt, “ Kyoto Philosophy—Intrinsically Nationalistic?,”  in Rude 
Awakenings, p. 245, note 26.
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Heidegger’s writings and acts that were overtly and intentionally politi­
cal and Nishida’s that were not, is still apparent, I think. A third differ­
ence is that Heidegger was intentionally complicit, whereas Nishida 
was complicit more by effect than intention—even if one should be held 
responsible as much for effects as for intentions and even if the two 
merge at points. Finally is the difference between what the philosophers 
were implicated in, that is, the difference between a Nazism that led to 
a holocaust and a Japanese totalitarianism that involved atrocities of 
its own.
The three reasons for politicizing Nishida’s philosophy—Nishida’s 
own turn to a social and historical philosophy, his later involvement 
with state officials, and the impact of the Heidegger incident on reading 
texts—all have to do with a shift in contexts: Nishida’s own shift; the 
shift occasioned by early rightist and leftist critics of his writings; and 
the shift to a reading sensitive to Heidegger-like Ungers of complicity. 
The review of these reasons now puts us in a position to shift Nishida’s 
philosophy of culture to yet another context: the contemporary world 
that recognizes itself as multicultural and not merely multinational.
An Appropriation o f  Nishida’s Philosophy o f  Culture
I will not attempt to undo the ways in which Nishida’s philosophy has 
been politicized. Instead I will suggest more contrasts in order to begin 
appropriating parts of his philosophy of culture in a world he could 
only partially foresee. First we will need to summarize the main points 
of that philosophy. Next I will say what parts of his analysis should be 
discarded and why, and also what needs to be discarded of the context 
often adapted today. Finally I will draw a sobering lesson from a 
parallel between Nishida’s multinational world and our multicultural 
nations. This largely negative exercise is meant to clear a space for a 
constructive appropriation of Nishida’s philosophy of culture.
In 1940 Nishida expanded and published his lectures on “ The Prob­
lem of Japanese Culture”  delivered two years previously.12 Four major 
points are particularly relevant to our discussion:13
12 The lectures are reproduced in NKZ 14, pp. 381-417; the book in NKZ 12, pp. 278- 
394. There are Spanish and French translations o f  the book: “ La crisis de la cultura 
Japonesa,”  in Nishida KitarO, Estado y  Filosophfa, translated by Agustin Jacinto
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1. Nishida advocates a “ world culture”  as a global arena for the 
encounter of various cultures. (To be sure, his notion of culture i f t  
seems closer to the German sense of Kultur or civilization than to an­
thropological usage.) A culture must be self-critical, not dogmatic, and 
must develop a scholarly methodology—an area in which Japan is rela­
tively weak.
2. Japanese culture must acquire a global character to properly 
respond both to Western culture and to its own tradition. (Nishida 
does not offer detailed characteristics of Japanese culture, as did his 
friend D. T. Suzuki and his student Hisamatsu Shin’ichi.)
3. True encounter with other cultures must be by way of seif-nega­
tion, not the East’s negation of the West or vice versa. The activity of 
self-negation creates an intercultural space in which encounter can take 
place and in which one’s own culture is relativized. (The relation be­
tween different cultures is parallel to that between “ I and Thou” in 
Nishida’s analysis.)
4. World culture is a telos or regulative idea to be achieved by acting 
(interacting) as if it were the present starting point and foundation for 
future development. It is a sort of Urkultur, not in the sense of a state 
of affairs that actually existed in past beginnings, but rather a project 
for the plurality of cultures in which each would understand itself as a 
particular form of a common culture. (Still, the idea of a world culture 
remains ambiguous in Nishida’s thought. Is it what all cultures come to 
have in common, the material contents that are eventually universal­
ized? Or is it the space in which particular cultures interact?) Either 
way, for Nishida something nonrelative, particular and even unique is 
found in relativizing one’s own culture.
To apply Nishida’s insights to the contemporary “ post-cold war” 
world will require some elimination as well as restatement. The major 
part of Nishida’s project that must be discarded is the Japan-centrism 
that is apparent in his philosophy of culture. The Problem o f  Japanese
Zavala (Mexico: El Colegio de Michoac&n, 1983); and Nishida KitarO, La Culture 
Japonaise en Question, translated by Pierre Lavelle (Paris: Publications Orientalistes 
de France, 1991).
13 For a more complete summary o f these points, see the essay by Ueda Shizuteru in 
Rude Awakenings. My additions are in parentheses.
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Culture had a different problem in mind than the problem contempora­
ry thinkers face. The problem Nishida saw was twofold: the West’s un­
derestimation of the East, particularly of Japanese tradition, and 
Japan’s ill-fated responses to that attitude. Nishida opposed the state’s 
responses to that twofold problem. One response was the Japanese 
state’s renunciation of past tradition, especially Buddhist tradition, in 
its attempt to modernize and become a technological power. Another 
response was the state’s attempt to compensate the people for its theft 
of tradition by celebrating State Shintoism, a construct that deified the 
person of the emperor and required unswerving loyalty to him in the 
name of being true to the soul of Japan Nishida proposed an
alternative response: a renewal of past tradition by recalling both the 
continuity of the imperial line and the value of Buddhist spirituality 
that could transform an egoistic nation. Nishida proposed an alterna­
tive to the West’s intellectual underestimation of the East as well. He 
saw Japan as the country in Asia that best retained Asian traditions, be­
cause Japan’s heritage was drawn from Indian and Chinese Buddhism 
and Chinese culture in general. And he saw Japan as the Asian country 
that had best modernized, that is, best adapted Western values and 
technology. Japan, in its ideal form at least, stood for the essence of 
Asia in a new world order, and it stood against Western domination. 
Japan was in a position to define the values and measures of the East as 
opposed to the West. Nishida attacked what we today call Eurocen­
trism by promoting an equivalent Japanism. Nishida’s own brand of 
Japan-centrism has to be rejected because we cannot solve the current 
problem of Eurocentrism by recourse to an equally embarrassing prob­
lem.
At the heart of both problems, both “ centrisms,”  is a gross oversim­
plification of differences. Some of Nishida’s most repeated pronounce­
ments about the nature of East and West seem like caricatures today. 
That the East hears the voice of the voiceless, and sees the form of the 
formless,14 or that it is based on nothingness (M) while the culture of 
the West is based on being (W)15—such statements, when repeated to­
day, represent the Nishida at his worst. When he made such pronounce-
14 NKZ 4, p. 6.
15 NKZ 7, pp. 429-430; 446.
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ments, in the 1930s, the challenge he faced was to assert the intellectual 
worth of Asian thought over against the domination of the self­
proclaimed West. But the time for such self-assertion of Japan in the 
name of “ the East”  is over. We have come to recognize that such state­
ments take into account neither the significant differences among Indi­
an, Southeast Asian, Chinese, Korean and Japanese traditions, nor 
significant parallels between, for example, some European and Sino- 
Japanese philosophical concepts of nothingness. We in turn would 
oversimplify Nishida’s highly nuanced views by taking such statements 
as the core of his “ logic of the East.”
Still another aspect of Nishida’s Japanism needs to be rejected as 
well: his assumption that the Japanese are and have always been one 
people (Rifc) sharing one language and culture and therefore naturally 
forming one nation, even if that nation must awaken to its global mean­
ing in order to become a true nation-state. Today we know better. The 
so-called homogeneity of the Japanese people is, in part, the result of 
long centuries of absorption and suppression of minority ethnic 
groups, Chinese, Korean, Okinawan, Ainu. And in part, this supposed 
homogeneity is a twentieth-century construct imposed on all the in­
digenous peoples in Japan, past and present, by the modern Japanese 
state. This particular kind of homogenization may not be as common 
in the so-called “ Western”  world, but nevertheless, as a response to 
Europe in the name of Japanese unity, it is related to Eurocentrism. 
It never occurred to Nishida to question the assumption of a homoge­
neous Japanese people.
What remains in Nishida’s philosophy of culture that we can ap­
propriate after we have eliminated the elements of his “ reverse Orien­
talism,”  as some critics have called it? And can we eliminate some 
parts and retain other parts of a philosophy that is deeply integrated 
and holistic, without distorting that philosophy? I believe that we can, 
as long as we do not discard key elements pell-mell or in their entirety, 
but rather consider substitutions for them that are appropriate to the 
contemporary world, fifty years after Nishida. This indeed is the task 
of appropriation.
In many respects, we live in the kind of global world that
Nishida envisioned. In other respects, individual nations have become 
“ globalized”  in ways that Nishida did not anticipate. Adopting the ar-
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chaic sense of nation (S , < c ) ,  Nishida took for granted that a single 
people formed the ethnic basis of a nation state, and he foresaw a mul­
ticultural world of different ethnic nations. He did not recognize or 
foresee multi-ethnic or multicultural nations, consisting of various 
groups of people each with its own distinct language and tradition. The 
problem that Nishida addressed was how individual nations/peoples/ 
cultures could interact as equals and mutually determine themselves in 
the global world. For us today, an equally perplexing problem is how 
individual peoples or cultures can interact as equals within a single na­
tion. I will leave aside some technical points about Nishida thought we 
could achieve a truly global world. Instead I will draw out some 
parallel problems by way of substitution.
Nishida’s problem concerned nations confronting one another in a 
global arena, on the level of the whole world. It concerned the central 
role of Japanese culture in recognizing that nations are constituted by 
their interrelations and no longer primarily by the relation between 
government and individual. Today this problem is reflected on the level 
of the nation again, only not in the relation between government and 
individual, but more so between government and cultural group (which 
is what Tanabe called the “ species” ft).
One key passage in Nishida reads: “ A true world culture will be 
formed only by various cultures preserving their own respective view­
points, but simultaneously developing themselves through global medi­
ation. ” 16 To draw the parallel between Nishida’s vision and today’s 
multiculturalism, we can substitute nation for world culture in the 
same quotation: “ A true nation will be formed only by various cultures 
preserving their own respective viewpoints, but simultaneously develop­
ing themselves through national mediation.” In this substitution, the 
multicultural nation takes the place o f what Nishida called “the world 
culture. ”
Another substitution anticipates a contemporary solution to the 
problem of multiculturalism and also portends the difficulty with that 
type of solution. Already in 1934, Nishida wrote that, “ for a regional 
world to take shape, it is necessary for one country to assume a central
16 NKZ 7, pp. 452-3.
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position and shoulder the responsibility.” 17 We need merely substitute 
nation for world, and culture (or people) for country, to make the tran­
sition to today: “ for a [multicultural] nation to take shape, it is neces­
sary for one culture to assume a central position and shoulder the 
responsibility.” In Nishida’s thought, Japan was the ideal mediator, 
leader, and protector. Surprisingly, some philosophers propose a 
parallel solution to today’s problem of multiculturalism. For these 
philosophers, in today’s multicultural nation the dominant culture 
takes the place, for better or worse, that Japan held for Nishida. Let 
me explain.
Nations such as the United States, Canada and Mexico are each tradi­
tionally home to peoples of several different cultures and languages. 
Post-cold war nations like Germany are increasingly multicultural. 
(Perhaps someday Japan too will recognize that a diversity of peoples 
have inhabited its islands and formed its traditions.) In many coun­
tries, the rise of ethnic consciousness and calls for self-determination 
are on the increase. Although there may be no strong separatist move­
ments in the United States as there are in Canada, for example, the 
relation between ethnicity and national identity is a problem in the 
USA too. Can a nation sustain its own identity and at the same time 
that of multiple peoples living in its boundaries? Answers are controver­
sial today. The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor argues that, in a 
multicultural society, the only viable government is one that protects 
the basic rights and welfare of nondominant groups and yet nurtures 
the particular culture that is historically dominant.18 The role of the na­
tion in this view, I suppose, would be to mediate nondominant cultures 
through the particular dominant culture. The nation here overlaps 
with, but is not synonymous with, the government insofar as the 
government is striving to become truly representational of all its peo-
17 nkz  12, pp. 429. Agustin Jacinto Zavala has pointed out to me that Nishida’s 
thinking subsequently changed concerning what must shoulder the responsibility. 
Nishida first saw the state as the active subject shutai i &  that was to accomplish the 
task o f the present world; later he placed the people (minzoku R & ) or in some con­
texts, more abstractly, a “ creative element”  (sOzOteki yOso in this role.
”  “ The Politics o f Recognition”  in Charles Taylor et al.. Multiculturalism (Prince­
ton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 25-73.
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pies or cultures. That is, what matters is not merely the individual 
representative, but his or her gender, race, ethnicity, etc. This roughly 
describes the situation of the United States.
But this ideal mediator role is undermined often by the historical rela­
tion between a dominant culture and the nondominant cultures. In the 
United States, for example, the politically dominant Anglo or white cul­
ture feels threatened “ from the outside”  by the growing population of 
Hispanics, Asians and African-Americans that will soon outnumber 
whites in states such as California. The dominant culture is threatened 
internally by the increasing recognition of its own history of violence 
toward the nondominant peoples, a history of enslaving blacks and 
nearly exterminating Native Americans. Thus the particular culture 
that happens to be the politically dominant one became dominant 
through force in a way resented by the nondominant cultures. The 
force, moreover, was often exerted in the name of nation-building. It is 
questionable, therefore, whether the nation “ built”  by the now 
dominant people can preserve that people. Nations with a history of 
colonizing other peoples who then became its immigrant citizens face a 
similar problem. The ideal of the dominator’s mediating role has 
become highly problematic.
Have, then, some nations evolved to the point where the global or 
“ world-historical standpoint” envisioned by Nishida is
now embodied in a single nation? If so, that development has meant a 
gigantic problem for nations, not an ideal state. This is one negative les­
son I think we learn from Nishida’s philosophy of culture.
The other lesson has more directly to do with current habits of con­
textualizing philosophers like Nishida and their “ world.” Again I 
diverge from the specific content of his philosophy of culture and focus 
instead on a context in which it is read. If we are to discard the Japan­
centrism of Nishida’s philosophy of culture, we must also abandon our 
reading him as an “ Oriental” philosopher. Just as Japan no longer 
stands for Asia in the realization of a global world, if it ever did, Nishi­
da does not represent “ Eastern”  or “ non-Western philosophy.”  Even 
the cursory sketch I have drawn here begins to show that the most basic 
problems Nishida dealt with are universal, and his way of dealing with 
them contrasts as much with other Asian philosophers as with 
philosophers of the so-called West. His philosophy of culture should 
be evaluated and appropriated in a way that does not discriminate be-
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tween massive and increasingly meaningless cultural or geographical 
blocks like “ East”  and “ West.” For reasons I have elaborated else­
where, it is time to put “ East” and “ West” to rest.19
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